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The main question driving the carefully crafted investigations developed in Bence
Nanay’s Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception and Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and
the Third Culture is one which, in its modern guise, has arisen at increasingly
regular intervals in our discipline: Is empirical psychology – broadly conceived –
relevant to philosophical aesthetics?1 That is to say, can alternative approaches
to art and aesthetic experience, including the methods yielding experimental,
cognitive, and perceptual data about such experience, contribute to the ways
in which philosophers examine aesthetic phenomena in a meaningful way. 
If so, how? There are at least two reasons why it has been important to return
to this question with such frequency. First, what we mean by ‘psychology’
continues to evolve at an impressive pace. At least in its most current
understanding, when we first start hearing about ‘naturalizing aesthetics’ between
fifteen and twenty years ago, the project found its most vocal proponents in
the guise of so-called ‘neuroaesthetics’ and the work of scientists such William
Hirstein, V. S. Ramachandran, Robert Solso, Dahlia Zaidel, and Semir Zeki.2
To many, empirical approaches of this kind gave a bad name to psychology as
applied to aesthetics for some years to come, feeding into what was once
described as a ‘culture of mutual distrust’ between the disciplines.3 Luckily, 
our conception of such lines of investigation into aesthetic phenomena has
been considerably enriched since then, to include not only our basic neurology
and Darwinian sexual selection theory, but our perception more broadly,
including aspects central to the contemporary philosophy of mind and
philosophy of emotions. The second reason why it is important to push this
question to the forefront of our inquiries regularly is that every now and again
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our community produces excellent research which brings some of the most
recent experimental information directly to bear on the questions that we care
most about: how we experience art, what sets aesthetic experience apart from
other kinds of experience, why art matters to us. Smith’s and Nanay’s books 
are highly valuable contributions not just to these concerns, but also to 
the metaphilosophy of aesthetics, that is to say, to how we as philosophers
should think about the relations between these different approaches, and
exactly which elements of our psychology can be fruitful to specific debates
in philosophical aesthetics. 
If the neuroaesthetics of the late 1990s supported a visualization of the
philosophical and empirical projects as operating in parallel with one another –
engaged on neighbouring trajectories but never actually intersecting – 
the conceptual picture which has emerged more recently, in great part thanks to
research such as Nanay’s and Smith’s, clearly relies on more generous frameworks
of communication and reference. Here, it might still make some sense to talk of
the philosophical and empirical perspectives respectively as originating from
different starting points and converging in a constructive manner, perhaps in
a triangular structure such as the one Smith favours. Nonetheless, it seems more
apparent than ever that if we continue on the current trajectory, even such a fairly
minor differentiation should eventually cease to make sense, and talk of different
approaches working together in any geometrical formation would itself become
superfluous. What we will have, then, is just one inclusive thick explanation,
resting on all the diverse elements that contribute to its explanatory power. 
It seems perhaps that a more accurate theme for this discussion is not so much
whether psychology is relevant to aesthetics but, rather, in which respects
psychology is central to it.
Anyone who reads either of these books stands to benefit from a broadening
of their horizons, no matter how progressive we think ourselves to be with regards
to this kind of research programme. Both offer the opportunity for us to rethink
and revise the methodologies relevant to aesthetics and to resolve particular
problems pertaining to our field. In practice at least, aesthetics knows no
boundaries.
What I would like to do in these brief comments is to raise some questions with
regard to what Nanay and Smith describe as that which is phenomenologically
distinct about aesthetic experience. In this particular context such a concern is
hardly peripheral to the overarching project since our ability to establish whether
the aesthetic can resist the reductivism which accompanies most versions of
naturalism and naturalization rests at least partly upon this question. In this
process, I will point to some of the areas that call for further clarification or detail
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should Nanay and Smith, as we have good reasons to believe, turn out to be right
about their shared philosophical commitments. 
I
Let us begin by reflecting on that which is said to be distinctive of aesthetic
experience or aesthetic perception. According to the theory developed by Nanay,
when we have an aesthetic experience of the paradigmatic kind, we have an
experience ‘very similar to the experience of treating an object to be unique’.4 That
is, looking at something aesthetically is similar to how we look when we
encounter something for the first time. Nanay writes:
If we encounter an object that is unique, we don’t really know how to attend to it; which
properties of it we should attend to and which ones we should ignore. We have no
precedent of how to do this […] So we have no blueprint to follow: we try out attending
to all kinds of properties of the object – our attention is distributed.5
Nanay’s main aim here is not to capture a definition of aesthetic experience as
such, but rather to point to how we must understand the role of attention in
typical cases of aesthetic experience. His claim, then, is that aesthetic attention is
focused on objects but distributed onto the various properties of that object.
Although I won’t address the topic of distributed attention directly here, 
one important aspect which Nanay takes to support his account of aesthetic
perception is the so-called ‘lingering effect’ of aesthetically attending to
something (through such distributed attention). An effect of this kind may occur,
for example, when we have had an aesthetic experience in an art gallery. We
engage with the pieces not simply by focusing on the exhibited objects but
primarily by distributing our attention onto its various properties. As a result,
according to Nanay, we tend not to be able to leave our aesthetic attention at
the door of the gallery when we exit that space. Instead, the mode of perception
may stay with us somehow, following and colouring our engagement with 
the world and its contents for some time. In other words, we can activate our
aesthetic attention in the museum, but we may not be able to deactivate it quite
as easily. Instead, it is gradually tuned out. As Nanay puts it, ‘after having spent
a day in the museum, our experience of the banal scenes on leaving the museum
tends to retain some kind of aesthetic character’.6
Importantly, we can explain this aesthetic form of lingering not only by
appealing to distributed attention, but also by emphasizing the role of so-called
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aesthetically relevant properties.7 The idea here is that aesthetic properties as
such raise a whole host of conceptual, perceptual, metaphysical, and even
programmatic problems, which can be avoided, Nanay suggests, by thinking in
terms of relevance instead. So, while aesthetic properties cannot explain this
lingering effect single-handedly, introducing the notion of aesthetically relevant
properties gives us the tools to do so. Or so Nanay argues. 
In some respects, I am sympathetic to the suggestion that a neatly delimited
category of aesthetic properties is something of a red herring (if only for 
the extremely high expectations that positing such a notion involves for any
theory aiming to explain not only what unites such an extremely diverse
collection of qualities, but also their varying valence). That said, I worry about
Nanay’s conception of this lingering effect, what the real benefits of jeopardizing
the broader notion of aesthetic properties consist of, and whether it really is 
the case that uniqueness in art is primarily a matter of the uniqueness of attention. 
For one thing, I don’t entirely recognize my own aesthetic phenomenology
in the general description given. It seems to me that the lingering effect of art
is both richer and more specific – in the sense that it is more targeted on an
experience of the actual artwork – than Nanay’s account may be able to allow
for. When I leave the gallery or the museum, I may well not be able to ‘deactivate’
my aesthetic attention immediately, and may well carry an aesthetically tainted
way of seeing the world along with me for an extra few minutes. But this does
not seem to be exclusively – or even primarily – a matter of a strictly perceptual
mode of attention. The lingering effect bears witness to the fact that it is 
the experience of perceiving a very specific work (or several very specific works)
of art that ‘stays with me’, as it were, the phenomenological details of which
colour my ensuing experience and enable me to pick up certain features I might
otherwise not have noticed in the world beyond the artwork (or indeed put
them in certain connections with one another). In other words, the lingering
effect of engaging aesthetically with art stems largely from how such
engagements affect other continuing mental states, such as the beliefs
pertaining to states of affairs external to the work and our perception of it,
including our moral beliefs and deliberations. If we discard too casually all
reference to what it was we were looking at, and why we found it interesting 
or even captivating to begin with, we risk losing our focus on the more
transformative kind of aesthetic experience which we tend to seek when we
engage with art and in terms of which, I would argue, at least many cases of 
the lingering effect of art is best understood. 
7 Ibid., 65.
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So, rather than an activated mode of visual attention which is gradually
phased out, it seems to me that it is first and foremost the elements of
engaging with the work which I find the most enriching, such as the set 
of insights or emotions evoked, which stay with me qua perceiver. And this
leads us straight to the question of aesthetic properties. For it is greatly in part
due to the aesthetic value – most probably best conceived as a combination
of reliably aesthetic properties, such as beauty or harmony, and properties 
that happen to be aesthetically relevant on a given occasion – and the role 
such value plays in aesthetically informed perceptual experience which 
directly influences the lingering perceptual effect of art, its duration and
significance. 
Surprisingly perhaps, the language with which Nanay describes the uniqueness
of the aesthetic seems at times Kantian in spirit, such as when aesthetic
experience is characterized as being ‘very much akin to encountering
something for the very first time’.8 We find a strong element of the unexpected,
the impossibility of predicting when aesthetic experience might occur, 
the delightful freedom of newness and lack of rules or principles, and more.
But can all this richness and complexity be maintained purely at the level of
perception? For Nanay’s project is not just one of bringing a psychologically
informed philosophy of perception to bear on questions in aesthetics. It is also
one of making the more general point that aesthetics is, in effect, a branch of
the philosophy of perception. What is the price to pay for that view? Well, quite
a high price, possibly, bearing in mind that a fair number of the concepts
aesthetics tends to rely on, such as aesthetic properties, aesthetic objects and
perhaps even subjects, may suddenly find themselves dispensable, replaced
by simpler and thinner perceptual concepts: we would perhaps no longer be
subjects of experience but perceivers, albeit it richly equipped, distributing our
attention on all properties that might be aesthetically relevant. 
II
In his Film, Art, and The Third Culture, Murray Smith – for whom the process of
naturalizing aesthetics in a new way is central – specifically asks his readers: 
[is there] a distinctive mental state which constitutes ‘aesthetic attention’ or 
the ‘aesthetic attitude’ – a form of consciousness systematically distinct from ordinary,
‘interested’ consciousness, characteristically prompted by artworks and other natural 
or artefactual aesthetic prompts?9
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The ‘triangulating’ method favoured combines (i) the phenomenological, (ii)
the psychological, and (iii) the neurological levels of analysis into one thick
explanation, and so, we are told: ‘The door is thereby opened to admit […] 
the first-person perspective within a scientific approach to the mind.’10
Smith’s answer is that ‘aesthetic experience arises when our perceptual,
affective, and cognitive capacities are engaged in a way that goes beyond their
normal functioning, and that such engagement prompts us to savour and reflect
upon the resultant experiences’.11 Further on, he writes: ‘When [aesthetic]
experiences go well, they are not merely had, but savoured. They become 
the object of a particular kind of self-consciousness.’12 This special kind of self-
consciousness known as aesthetic experience, this ‘savouring’ or ‘retrospection’,
thus combines a whole host of states and abilities both in what we might call its
production, its phenomenology, and in its aftermath. It is not only reflective and
emotionally laden, it is also self-reflective and affectively enjoyed as reflection or
retrospection. We have an experience and at the same time an experience of that
experience: aesthetic experiences are enjoyed, felt, and retrospected upon in
a special way qua objects of a special form of self-consciousness which is
distinctive of aesthetic attention. 
It seems both right and important to point out, as Smith does here, that there
are important cognitive aspects of our aesthetic experiences which tend to be
overlooked, and that conceiving of such experiences primarily as affective and
fairly passive responses is fundamentally unhelpful not only to philosophical
analysis but also to daily life. That said, the generous and inclusive spirit of Smith’s
triangulation and thick explanation raises questions of its own. Are we now not
trying to fit too much into the account of what is supposed to be our distinctly
aesthetic phenomenology? For if all aspects of the psychological, neurological,
and phenomenological are potential contributors to our aesthetic explanations,
by what means exactly do we assess the explanatory weight each of them might
carry separately? The question relates directly to how we should balance the input
or emphasis of either of the three corners in this triangular structure. 
Smith surveys the basic concepts at the heart of the triangulation of 
the phenomenological including attention, consciousness, the degrees of
consciousness of peripheral factors, self-consciousness, the unconscious, 
the ‘cognitive’ or ‘adaptive’ unconscious, and more. In spirit, such inclusivity is
surely on the right track of providing a solid theory of aesthetic experience. And
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operating with a notion of the cognitive which embraces subconscious elements,
where should we draw the line between those aspects which are directly relevant
to aesthetic experience and those which are not? How could we know? Or, to put
the point in Smith’s own terms, how thick can a thick explanation become and
still remain an explanation (of anything)?
Some of these questions are tied up with a methodological point one might
want to press Nanay on too. For one might think that an important advantage of
a method which seeks to incorporate the results of psychological investigations
is precisely that our explanations are grounded in information, facts, evidence, or
data which in some sense at least apply across aesthetic agents, regardless of all
the purely personal, idiosyncratic qualities which can make us such unreliable
aesthetic judges. But if aspects of our aesthetic experience are subconscious or
subpersonal features of our micro-perceptual or phenomenological experience,
have we really strengthened the foundations of our explanations or, to exaggerate
a little perhaps, simply replaced them by some other explanatory features that
are not obviously all that far-reaching either? Exactly what do we find behind
the ‘door [to] the first-person perspective within a scientific approach to 
the mind’? And this, of course, is directly connected with a broader concern about
the reach of thick explanations in general: Is aesthetics now less about explaining
aesthetic experience or aesthetic value and more about explaining phenomena
with some aesthetic component? One possible answer here of course is that
a distinction of this kind is merely nominal: what is an aesthetic experience if not
an experience with some (more or less significant) aesthetic components? 
Be that as it may, the special savouring and introspection so aptly described 
by Smith reminds one of the probing questions which arise for anyone who seeks
both to naturalize (and in that sense at least normalize) and to customize 
the aesthetic at the same time.
The theory outlined by Smith is reinforced by the many interesting examples
of films incorporated into his arguments. Indeed, one of the strengths of Smith’s
naturalizing project is the intricate way in which he weaves his account into
a detailed understanding of works such as Edgar Reitz’s Heimat film series,
demonstrating step by step how a theory informed ‘by psychological,
evolutionary, and neuroscientific research on the emotions’ can affect our artistic
experience.13 In a similar vein, Nanay’s discussion of Paul Klee serves as a helpful
point of reference connecting theory with practice. It is fair to say, then, that both
Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception and Film, Art, and the Third Culture
demonstrate significant advances on many previous attempts to marry research
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in philosophical aesthetics with approaches, models, and methodologies drawn
from the empirical sciences, and both make for extremely refreshing reading in
respect of the concept of aesthetic experience which is thus allowed for. One of
the many things we stand to learn from Nanay’s and Smith’s work is that asking
whether empirically informed psychology is relevant to philosophical aesthetics
is now no longer so much a question to which we should return at regular
intervals in philosophy, as one which should retain a permanent place on the
drawing board.
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